(Summary of Chapter 1 of Ethical Intuitionism by Michael Huemer)
Ethics is about what’s right and wrong, what should or shouldn’t be done, what’s good or bad. Examples of ethical statements include: “America should have a different immigration policy,” “Stalin was evil,” and “Honesty is a virtue.” In contrast, metaethics is about the nature of ethical statements. The four branches of metaethics are constituted by semantic, epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological questions.
An example of a semantic question would be: “What does ‘goodness’ mean?” or “Can ‘goodness’ be defined, and if so, what does it refer to?”
An epistemological question would be: “How do we know that cheating is wrong?” or “How can we justify our moral judgments?”
Metaethicists interested in metaphysics might ask, “Are some ethical statements objectively true?”
And psychological questions regarding metaethics might include: “What motivates us to do what’s right?” and “Do we have reasons to be moral?”
Here I’ll just be laying out the traditional metaphysical theories, but in later weeks, I’ll probably address each of the branches of metaethics and refer to the taxonomy sketched below as a jumping off point for another post. It’s important to note at the outset, however, that these branches do overlap considerably. If, for instance, we can’t know any ethical truths (epistemology), that will have a bearing on why we’re motivated to do what we think is right (psychology). And how we define concepts like “objectivity” (semantics) will be relevant to whether certain ethical statements are objectively true (metaphysics). For now, this latter overlap needs explanation.
What I mean when I say that ethical statements are objective is that they are not subjective; and to say that ethical statements are subjective means that they constitutively depend at least in part on the psychological attitude or response that observers have (or would have) toward those statements. There’s a lot in this definition, so some examples might be helpful. Funniness is subjective because jokes, comedians, or gifs are funny just in case people are amused by them. “Funny” roughly means something like “tends to amuse audiences,” and that amusement is a psychological attitude of an observer. Hence, the subjectivity of funniness. Likewise, sexiness is subjective because a sexy person is someone to whom other people are attracted. Squareness, on the other hand, is an objective property, because an object is square regardless of what people think or feel about that object. Happiness, on this view, would *not* count as a subjective property because, although it depends on a psychological attitude, it does *not* constitutively depend on an *observer’s* psychological attitude. That is, you can be happy even if no one thinks or feels anything about you.
With these definitions in mind, then, we can begin categorizing metaethical theories. The first distinction that’s usually drawn among philosophers is between realists and anti-realists. To the question, “Is morality objective?” realists say yes. Anti-realists say no.
The realists split into two camps, naturalists and intuitionists. Naturalists believe that moral statements can be reduced to non-evaluative statements. “Moral goodness,” on this view, might be defined or explained in terms of what promotes human survival, health, or happiness.
Intuitionists, in contrast, believe that moral statements can not be reduced in this way. Instead, “moral goodness” is inextricably value laden. Though empirical investigation can inform our moral judgments, empirical truths don’t constitute morality. Some moral truths, intuitionists claim, are known through intuition alone.
The anti-realists come in three varieties. The first is non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivists hold that moral statements don’t refer to propositions at all. “Proposition” is tricky to define, but some examples of non-propositional statements might be helpful in clarifying this point. “Hurray!” and “Boo!” are non-propositional because they are neither true nor false. Similarly, “Don’t steal!” is a non-propositional statement because it would be nonsensical to say that the statement is true or false. It’s an imperative, not a declarative. Truth and falsity don’t apply to those statements any more than smells to numbers. The number 18 might or might not be prime, or even, or greater than 3, but asking what it smells like is a category mistake. Similarly, non-cognitivists would say that it’s nonsensical to say that moral statements are true or false. Moral statements, they say, are akin to expressions of emotion (e.g. Boo, Stalin! or Hurray, charity!) or imperatives (e.g. Please be kind! or Don’t murder!) rather than propositional statements like “The Earth is round.”
The other two anti-realist varieties are cognitivist. In other words, moral statements are propositional. Subjectivists, moreover, would say that these statements are at least sometimes true. What makes them true, however, are not objective properties. Rather, subjectivists maintain that morality is constituted by an individual’s or group’s (tendency to have an) attitude or reaction to something. Egoists, for instance, would say that “X is good” just means “I approve of X.” Cultural relativists (of a certain sort) might say that “X is good” just means “My culture approves of X.”
Because they are cognitivists, nihilists would agree that moral statements are propositional. However, they would say that all moral statements are false. It’s false, for instance, that murder is wrong. It’s false that kindness is a virtue. It’s false that we should help others. More generally, “nihilism” as I understand the term is the belief that (1) moral statements are statements about alleged non-natural, objective properties but that (2) there really are no such properties. The reason for this admittedly peculiar definition is that nihilists, presumably, would not deny the existence of natural or subjective properties. They wouldn’t deny that people can be happy or that people approve of things. They would, however, deny the existence of moral truth. In a sense, then, nihilism is the negation of intuitionism.
These five metaethical theories I’ve sketched out exhaust the space of possible theories. Either moral statements are or are not propositional. If they are not propositional, non-cognitivism is true. If they are propositional, they are either all false or at least sometimes true. If all moral statements are false, then nihilism is true. If moral statements are at least sometimes true, they are either objective or subjective. If they are subjective, then subjectivism is true. If they are objective, then they are either reducible to natural properties or not. If they are, then naturalism is true. If they are not, then intuitionism is true. The TL;DR at the top of this post may be helpful for anyone who wants to quickly visualize the outline I’ve sketched so far. Michael Huemer, the author of Ethical Intuitionism, believes the structure of the flow chart I’ve made is misleading, and I agree with him. I’ve decided to include it anyway because I’m really really slow at making flow charts, and the alternative is only marginally more useful.
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