The mark of a good
scientist is their willingness to expose themselves to criticism. Only by listening to the dissenting views of
others can we escape our own prejudices and cognitive limitations. This is particularly important for the views
we find most certain. There's sometimes
a tendency to pay lip service to the free expression of ideas when talking
about what to eat for dinner or what music sounds best, but when it comes to
the ideas we're most committed to, we put up our barriers and shut down the
conversation.
In my own
investigations, I try to avoid this as much as possible. I try to seek out criticism. For instance, in several of my previous posts, I've discussed the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), a model which I
think is approximately correct. Moral
judgments are predominantly caused by our automatic intuitions, and reasoned
deliberation takes a back seat. However,
my posts have not been uniformly uncritical.
It's in this vein that I'd like to discuss another criticism of Haidt's
model of moral judgment.
In response to
Haidt, Pizarro and Bloom point out situations in which people do deliberate
about what moral actions to take. They
suggest several approaches by which this might occur. First, people may deliberately change their
appraisal of a situation. Imagine, for
instance, being told that you will watch a gory factory accident. You have the ability to choose to take a
detached analytical mindset or not. If
you do, your emotional reaction to the event will consequently be
diminished. The fact that this is
possible suggests that our intuitions aren't simple on off switches. Rather, deliberation may modulate the effect
of our intuitive reactions.
A second way in
which we can alter our moral judgments by the force of reason is by exerting
control over the situations which we encounter.
Imagine a person on a diet throwing away all their junk food or a drug
addict flushing their drugs. It's true
that if these people saw the enticing cues, their desires would flare up and be
near implacable. Nevertheless, the
initial act of defiance is the product of careful deliberation.
Moreover, Pizarro
and Bloom point out that many decisions are made in opposition to prevailing
societal mores. Examples include
"righteous Gentiles" in Nazi Germany, children who insist on becoming
vegetarians within nonvegetarian families, college professors who defend the
abolistion of tenure, etc. Because the
SIM suggests that our moral judgments are often driven by a desire to fit in
with the crowd, these exemplary decisions to buck the trend cast doubt upon
Haidt's model.
Finally, Pizarro and
Bloom suggest that some questions of morality cannot be answered by simple
intuitions. Haidt's stimuli consist of
contrived hypothetical scenarios. Real
life, however, is filled with questions like: How much should I give to
charity? What is the proper balance of
work and family? What are my obligations
to my friends? These questions require
careful deliberation, and they don't admit of quick intuitive responses.
For these reasons,
Pizarro and Bloom defend the rationalist position. Though some moral judgments are no doubt
driven by intuitive responses, reason remains the dominant source of moral
judgments in everyday life.
Normally, I would
provide my comments at this point.
However, Haidt himself has responded directly to Pizarro and Bloom, a
response which will be the subject of my next post.
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